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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ] 
SECURITY, and PAPER CALMENSON 
& COMPANY. : 
Respondents. ) 
) Case N o . 20782 
BRIEF OF CLAIMANT/PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the employer had just cause for 
terminating the claimant from his employment. 
2. Whether the claimant was able and available 
for employment during the week ending January 12, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 14, 1985, the Department of Employment 
Security denied unemployment insurance benefits effective 
December 30, 1984 because it determined that the claimant 
was discharged for just cause. (R. 0088) On January 21, 
1985, the Department denied compensation for the week ending 
January 12, 1985 on the grounds that the claimant was not 
available for work. (R. 0085) After a hearing, the Admin-
istrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) affirmed both deter-
minations (R. 0011-13, 0056-58) The Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission concurred with the ALJ's opinion in a 
2-1 decision. (R. 0009-010, 0035-36) The claimant 
requested reconsideration by the Board, but his petition was 
refused. (R. 0007, 0021) 
The claimant asks this court to reverse the 
decision of the Board of Review and order payment of unem-
ployment compensation for the weeks benefits were denied. 
In the alternative, the claimant seeks a remand to the ALJ 
for the purposes of taking testimony concerning the matters 
set forth in Rule A71-07-2: Able and Available, Section 
150.15. 
The claimant was employed by Paper, Calmenson and 
Company from August 27, 1985 until he lost his job on 
November 9, 1985. (R. 0011) The reasons for his discharge 
were alleged excessive absenteeism and poor attitude. (R. 
0093) After termination, the claimant applied for unem-
ployment compensation. (R. 0095) 
The Department of Employment Security denied the 
claimant's request for benefits (R. 0088), and the ALJ 
affirmed this decision. (R. 0011-13, 0056-58) He believed 
that the absences were excusable, but determined that the 
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claimant's attitude adversely affected the company. (R. 
0012, 0057) This led him to conclude that the discharge was 
for just cause and, consequently, the application for 
compensation was denied. Id. 
For the week ending January 12, 1985, the ALJ 
determined that there was a different reason for refusing 
benefits. The claimant left his home in Panguitch for 
approximately thirty six hours to attend his grandmother's 
funeral in Grand Junction, Colorado. (R. 0078) This 
absence from the labor market, according to the ALJ, ren-
dered the claimant unavailable to accept work. (R. 0012-13, 
0057-58) Compensation was denied on this basis as well. 
(R. 0013, 0058) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Under Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)2 adopted by 
the court in Kehl v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm., 700 
P.2d 1129 (Ut. 1985), an employee may be denied unemployment 
benefits if his employer had just cause in terminating him. 
Just cause is premised on a finding of fault and requires 
consideration of three elements: culpability, knowledge and 
control. When the claimantfs actions are considered under 
this standard, a finding of just cause is not supported by 
substantial evidence. Sufficient evidence was not 
etablished to show a serious effect on the employer's 
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rightful interests. Further, the evidence does not show 
that the claimant had clear knowledge that his actions would 
result in his termination. 
B. The ALJ failed to properly consider whether 
the claimant was able and available for work during the week 
of January 12, 1985. The ALJ considered only whether 
claimant was physically present and did not look at other 
circumstantial factors required by relevant case law. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S BOARD OF 
REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ALJ'S 
DETERMINATION THAT THE CLAIMANT 
WAS DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE. 
The claimant was denied unemployment compensation 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(2)(a)(Interim Sup.. 
1984), which renders ineligible those who have been dis-
charged for "just cause11. Ld. The ALJ held that this 
statute disposed of the benefits claim because the claimant's 
termination was justified. (F. 0012, 0057) The 
Board of Review affirmed the result. (R. 0009, 0035) 
This decision of the Industrial Commission is 
subject to a two-pronged standard of review. Reversal is 
warranted where two requirements have been satisfied. Gocke 
V. Wiesley, 18 U.2d 245, 248, 420 P.2d 44, 45 (1966). 
First, there must be proof that substantial evidence does 
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not support the decision below. Denby v. Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Ut. 1977). 
Second, the record must clearly and persuasively establish a 
right to compensation, rendering the refusal to make an 
award "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable." Continental 
Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 568 
P.2d 727, 729 (Ut. 1977). 
The present appeal involves an examination of the 
ALJ's rationale for his decision. His determination that 
the claimant was discharged for "just cause" should be 
evaluated with reference to the legal definition of that 
term. Such a comparison will reveal the error of the 
disposition below. 
At the time of the ALJ!s determination, no 
authoritive definition of just cause existed. There was 
merely a proposed administrative provision interpreting the 
term. This regulation was eventually adopted as the common 
law standard in Kehl v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission, supra, but only after the administrative 
decision became final. 
Although the provisions of the proposed regulation 
were not in effect at the time of the hearing, they still 
should control the outcome of the present appeal. Two 
reasons justify this conclusion. First, there is no other 
pertinent rule of law in Utah. If reference to the 
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administrative interpretation is foreclosed, then a 
significant tool of construction would be lost. Second, and 
more important, the terms of the proposed regulation provide 
a reasonable and rational interpretation of the phrase "just 
cause," Kehl, supra, at 1134. There is no logical reason 
for declining use of the rule. 
The proposed definition states that the just cause 
requirement is satisfied by a finding of fault. Proposed 
Rule A71-07-l:5(A)2. Fault is composed of three elements, 
culpability, knowledge and control. An explanation of each 
of these components is set forth in the rule. It provides: 
The basic factors which establish fault 
and are essential to a determination 
of ineligibility under the definition of 
just cause are: 
a. Culpability. This is the 
seriousness of the conduct as it 
affects the continuance of the 
employment relationship. The discharge 
must have been necessary to avoid 
actual or potential harm to the 
employer's rightful interests. A 
discharge would not be considered 
necessary if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices. 
The wrongness of the conduct must 
be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it 
affects the employer's rights. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of 
poor judgment and there is no expecta-
tion that the conduct will be 
continued or repeated, potential harm 
may not be shown and, therefore, it is 
not necessary to discharge the employee. 
6 
b. Knowledge. The employee 
must have had a knowledge of the 
conduct which the employer expected. 
It is not necessary that the claimant 
intended to cause harm to the 
employer, but he should reasonably 
have been able to anticipate the 
effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established 
unless the employer gave a clear explan-
ation of the expected behavior or had a 
pertinent written policy, except in the 
case of a flagrant violation of a 
universal standard of behavior. If 
the employer's expectations are unclear, 
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence 
of knowledge is not shown. A specific 
warning is one way of showing that the 
employee had knowledge of the expected 
conduct. After the employee is given 
a warning, he should be given an opportunity 
to correct objectionable conduct. 
Additional violations occurring after the 
warning would be necessary to establish 
just cause for discharge. 
c. Control. The conduct must have 
been within the power and capacity of the 
claimant to control or prevent. 
The ALJ determined that discharge in the present 
case was justified because the crlaimantf s attitude injured 
the employer's interests. (R. 0057) Two reasons were cited 
to support this conclusion. First, the claimant "often 
complained or questioned his job assignments", according to 
the ALJ, and second, he disputed instructions given by his 
supervisor. (R. 0057) The ALJ concluded that this 
"questionable attitude" "could have an adverse effect on the 
attitudes of the other workers." (R. 0057) These reasons 
should be scrutinized according to the requirements set 
7 
forth in Proposed Rule A71-07-l:5A which requires proof of 
the claimant1 s culpability, knowledge and control. 
A careful review of the somewhat confusing record 
discloses that substantial evidence was not identified by 
the ALJ to support the two key findings of culpability and 
knowledge. The employer alleges generally that the claimant 
had a "negative attitude" (R. 0063), but has failed to 
prove the seriousness of the claimant's alleged actions. 
There is a paucity of credible evidence to show that claim-
ant's alleged complaining or questioning caused any actual 
or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests. 
Further, as the claimant ably demonstrated at the hearing, 
the employer's own rules invited employees to "talk over 
frankly" with their supervisor any job-connected problems. 
(R. 0065) The employer failed to show that claimant's frank 
discussions of his job-related problems had any harmful 
effect at all. The substance of the employer's evidence 
consists of general accusations, all of which were denied by 
the claimant and countered effectively by his own affirma-
tive evidence. 
Further, the employer's general allegations do not 
demonstrate that the claimant acted knowingly. The 
knowledge element requires proof that the employee "should 
reasonably have been able to anticipate the effect his 
conduct would have." Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)3(b). It 
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is only satisfied when the employer has given a clear, 
unambiguous and consistent explanation of expected behavior. 
Id. Otherwise, knowledge is not shown. The messages 
received by the claimant were not of this nature. The 
record contains evidence of two instances which amply prove 
this point. 
First, as noted above, the employee handbook 
strongly encouraged frank discussion with the foreman 
regarding "any condition that might be a problem." (R. 
0065) The claimant followed this counsel and freely raised 
his concerns. (R. 0065-66) Yet upon doing so, he was 
condemned by his employer as being argumentative. (R. 0066) 
These contradictory messages disprove knowledge. 
Second, the warnings given to the claimant failed 
to adequately notify him of his shortcomings. He testified 
that his supervisor rarely, if ever, communicated eval-
uations of his performance to him (R. 0068, 0075) and when 
he was told, the language used was too vague. The only 
written warning the claimant received stated, "Dalefs 
quality is not as expected. His attitude has been on the 
negative side." (R. 0063) This message does not specif-
ically indicate, or even imply, the type of improvement 
needed. If anything, it downplays the seriousness of the 
alleged attitude problem. Moreover, the claimant's foreman 
testified that his verbal warnings were almost identical to 
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the written one. (R. 0076) All notices, therefore, were 
defective. The claimant could not have known what his 
employer expected. 
Like his general allegations, the employer's 
reference to a specific instance of conduct fails to 
demonstrate that the claimant acted culpably. At the 
hearing, the employer claimed that his employee began to 
"throw heat treat hanging fixtures around." (R. 0069) This 
conduct, according to the supervisor, was "dangerous" and 
"hostile." (R. 0069) The claimant specifically denied this 
allegation. Further, the record* contains no evidence 
indicating what effect, if any, these actions had on other 
employees or on the employer's rightful interests. 
The second finding of the ALJ concerns the claim-
ant1 s inability to follow directions. (R. 0012, 0057) This 
determination is probably based on a painting incident 
raised by the employer at the hearing. The claimant had 
been painting, and, according to his supervisor, had spread 
the coats too thickly. (R. 0068) Upon being notified of 
his error, he adjusted his technique and reduced the amount 
of paint applied. (R. 0069) This proved unsatisfactory, 
however, because the claimant later received complaints that 
each coat was too thin. (R. 0069) The employer claimed 
that the employee maliciously overcompensated. (R. 0069, 
0075) The claimant contends, however, that he merely made 
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an unintentional mistake. His supervisor failed to show him 
how to paint correctly (R. 0069) so the claimant was left to 
determine in good faith the amount of paint needed. It 
cannot be said that the claimant could reasonably anticipate 
the defects in his performance when he was not instructed 
how to paint properly. 
The third finding of the ALJ concerns the effect 
of the claimant's attitude on employee morale. The ALJ 
determined that the claimant's argumentative disposition 
could spread to other employees and, thus, injure the 
employer's interests. (R. 0012, 0057) He believed that 
this justified termination. (R. 0012, 0057) The record, 
however, does not support such a finding. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the culpability requirement of the 
proposed rule has been fulfilled. 
The culpability element relates to the seriousness 
of the worker's misconduct. It is satisfied when the 
discharge is "necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to 
the employer's rightful interests." Proposed Rule 
A71~07-l:5(A)3(a). In the present appeal, there is little 
in the record which even relates to the employer's position 
on the morale issue. The manager stated that the claimant 
sometimes complained to other employees. (R. 0068) The 
supervisor testified that workers believed the claimant had 
a bad attitude. (R. 0075) However, no written or oral 
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evidence of this allegation was produced by the employer. 
These comments do not indicate that the employees were 
bothered or influenced by the claimant. It only states that 
they noticed he complained about his job. The record, then, 
contains no evidence which shows that the employer was 
subject to actual or potential harm in the form of injury to 
employee morale. 
There is proof, on the other hand, which demon-
strates that the claimant positively influenced other 
workers with whom he associated. The claimant testified 
that he had good relations with his co-workers. (R. 0075) 
This opinion was corroborated by other employees. One 
fellow worker complained to the plant manager about the 
claimant's unjust discharge. (R. 0076) Two others wrote 
letters to the Board of Review stating that the claimant was 
a helpful co-worker who did not adversely affect employee 
morale. (R. 0042-45) 
The ALJ disputed these statements of fellow 
employees, claiming they did not disprove the potential ill 
effect of the claimant's attitude. He believed that this 
evidence only demonstrated the ability of the claimant to 
"get along" with his co-workers personally. (R. 0012, 0057) 
The claimant submits that the ALJ's reasoning on this point 
is flawed. An employee cannot maintain an affinity with 
co-workers and at the same time injure their morale. Work 
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activity is so intertwined with the personal relationships 
between employees that a worker could not be well liked by 
those whose attitudes he is supposedly damaging. If the 
claimant was spreading negative feelings around the plant, 
then his fellow employees would have shunned him and would 
not have voiced their complaints about his discharge. 
A careful review of the record shows that the 
findings of the ALJ were not established with respect to the 
argumentativeness and insubordination allegations, and the 
record fails to demonstrate that culpability was involved in 
the employee morale charge. There being no basis for 
denying unemployment compensation, it follows that the 
refusal to make an award was arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. An order entitling claimant to benefits is 
warranted. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S BOARD 
OF REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE 
ALJfS DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION FOR THE WEEK ENDING 
JANUARY 12, 1985. 
The claimant was denied unemployment compensation 
for the week ending January 12, 1985. (R. 0013, 0035) The 
ALJ attributed his ineligibility to unavailability for work. 
(R. 0013) Kay was out of the Panguitch labor market for 
more than one day, and, therefore, could not immediately 
accept full-time employment. jEd. This, according to the 
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ALJ, was the disqualifying factor. Id.. On appeal, the 
ALJ's determination was affirmed by the Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission. (R. 0035)• 
This decision of the Industrial Commission is 
subject to a dichotomous standard of review. Reversal is 
warranted when two requirements are satisfied. Gocke v. 
Wiesley, 18 U.2d 245, 248, 420 P.2d 44, 45 (1966). First, 
there must be proof that no substantial evidence sustains 
the earlier decision. Denby v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Ut. 1977). 
Additionally, the record must clearly and persuasively 
establish a right to compensation, rendering the refusal to 
make an award "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable." 
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission, 568 P.2d 727, 729 (Ut. 1977). 
The present appeal involves an examination of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-4-4 (c) (Supp. 1983). It provides: 
An unemployed individual shall be eligible 
to receive benefits with respect to any 
week only if it has been found by the 
commission that:...(c) He is able 
to work and is available for work 
during each and every week with 
respect to which he made a claim 
for benefits under this act... 
This passage indicates that an applicant's eli-
gibility for benefits is conditioned on his availability for 
work. The term "available" means being "genuinely attached 
14 
to the labor market." Denby, 567 P.2d at 628. It focuses 
on the subjective attitude of the claimant, i.e. whether he 
wants to go to work. JEd. However, a reasonable appraisal 
of the objective facts and circumstances involved should 
serve to establish the applicant's disposition. Lauder v. 
board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 29 U.2d 121, 
122, 506 P.2d 50, 51 (1973). 
This emphasis on objective measures of attitude is 
reflected in a regulation enacted by the Department of 
Employment Security. It provides additional guidance as to 
the meaning of the availability requirement: 
Absence from the claimant's labor market area 
results in a conclusion of nonavailability 
if the individual is restricted for more 
than one full working day within the 
customary work week of Monday through 
Friday excluding business holidays. 
For these purposes "one full working 
day" means from 8a.m. to 5 p.m. 
For example, if the individual is absent 
from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. or less in 
one day, benefits would not be denied. 
If the period continues into the 8 a.m. 
to 5 p.m. period or beyond in the next 
day or another day of the same 
week, benefits would be denied. 
Rule A71-07-2: Able and Available, 
Section 150.15. 
This section appears to focus on physical presence. 
Availability under the regulation is determined by whether 
the claimant remains within the job market or travels to 
areas outside it. 
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Presence in a particular locale, however, is not 
the sole factor involved in establishing availability. A 
claimant who remains away from the labor market for more 
than a full working day has not necessarily invalidated his 
unemployment compensation claim. Jld. Absence is only one 
of several factors to be considered. Others include the 
reasons for leaving, the possibility of accepting employment 
while outside the labor market, the genuineness of attempts 
to obtain employment and the efforts made to maintain 
contact with the employment area while away. Id. 
The administrative rule and the Denby and Lauder 
opinions indicate that the availability requirement has a 
circumstantial focus. Although the subjective disposition 
of the claimant is of primary importance, objective factors 
will be used to determine his attitude. Presence or absence 
with respect to a particular area is only one matter of 
consideration. 
The ALJ erred as a matter of law in the instant 
case by failing to recognize the circumstantial focus of the 
availability requirement. The record indicates that he was 
only concerned with claimant's presence in Panguitch. 
During the hearing, the ALJ noted that it would be impossi-
ble for an individual to be available for work when he is 
away from his residence for over twenty-four hours (R. 0079) 
and in his decision the ALJ stated: 
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"[T]he claimant had been out of his 
normal labor market area for more 
than one customary workday and he 
was not immediately available to 
accept full-time work." (R. 0013) 
It is clear that the ALJ considered no factors other than 
physical presence in determining Kay's availability for 
work. Consequently, the Board's decision on this point 
should be reversed and an order issued directing the ALJ to 
consider all matters set forth in the rule. 
The claimant submits, however, that remand for 
additional findings is unnecessary. While the ALJ did not 
expressly elicit from Kay information concerning the factors 
mentioned in the regulation, the record contains clear proof 
that the claimant was immediately available to accept work. 
He left Panguitch for more than a full working day, but the 
circumstances surrounding his departure are proof of a 
proper, work-seeking attitude. 
Kay left Panguitch for Grand Junction, Colorado to 
attend his grandmotherfs funeral. (R. 0078) Every aspect 
of the trip was planned to assure his availability for work. 
He departed at noon on January 8; but only after applying 
for Park Service employment and waiting in vain at the Job 
Service office for notice of other openings. (R. 0079-80) 
Upon his return the following evening, Kay was contacted by 
a Job Service worker and informed of positions that became 
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available during his absence, (R. 0079) None of them 
demanded immediate attention. Id. 
These facts surrounding Kay's trip parallel the 
matters mentioned in the administrative regulation. Kay's 
reason for leaving was to attend his grandmother's funeral. 
He was net on a frolic. His efforts to obtain work were 
genuine because he departed only after attempting to take 
advantage of every possible availability and he arranged to 
be immediately notified of job openings which arose during 
his absence. Moreover, it is likely that Kay's trip did not 
prevent him from accepting employment because the record 
suggests that no positions opened and closed while he was 
away. 
The ALJ's opinion is incorrect on these facts, and 
the Board's affirmance is improper. There is no substantial 
evidence to sustain its finding because when circumstantial 
evidence is considered, it should be concluded that Kay was 
available to accept work. The ALJ's sole emphasis on 
physical presence was arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. The Board should have overturned this aspect 
of the ALJ's decision. Consequently, an award of benefits 
for the week ending January 12, 1985 should not be denied 
because of unavailability. 
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CONCLUSION 
Substantial evidence was not developed at the 
hearing to establish just cause for claimant's termination 
and for the finding that he was not able and available for 
work. For these reasons stated, the decision of the Board 
of Review should be reversed and benefits granted. 
Alternatively, the cause should be remanded for a new 
hearing. 
DATED this /£ day of September, 1985. 
STEPHEN W. JULIAN 
Attorney for Claimant/Petitioner 
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